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When refl ecting on the subject of children and the 
Holocaust, Abraham Sutzkever’s “Poem about a 
Herring” (1946) nearly always springs fi rst to my mind. 
In this profoundly moving and semantically intricate 
work, Sutzkever (1913–2010)—a Holocaust survivor, 
partisan hero of the Lithuanian Jewish resistance, 
and “one of the great Yiddish poets of his generation” 
(Berger)—describes a scene of horror typical of the 
Einsatzgruppen “Aktions” that occurred throughout 
Eastern Europe following the commencement of 
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Operation Barbarossa, the Nazis’ great Eastern offensive, 
on 22 June 1941. The Einsatzgruppen, or “Special 
Operations Squads,” were paramilitary units composed 
of members of the Nazi SS and SD and of various 
German police forces, including the Gestapo, who 
followed in the military’s footsteps as the Wehrmacht 
sliced through Poland and the Baltic states on their 
way to eventual defeat at Stalingrad in February 1943. 
At sites such as Babi Yar, they massacred over a period 
of two days more than 33,000 Jewish civilians, most 
of whom were killed by bullets fi red at close range. 
Members of the Einsatzgruppen were responsible for the 
wet work of cultural cleansing from 1940 until 1942, 
when the psychological rigours of mass murder, coupled 
with the material wastefulness of this highly ineffi cient 
mode of human extermination, rendered concentration 
camps—capable of killing and disposing of millions of 
people—a more attractive option to the Nazi governing 
elite. 
In his poem, Sutzkever imagines a mother and her 
child perched together on the lip of a burial trench, 
facing their Nazi executioners:
 Right at the open limepit
 a child broke into tears:
 Mameh, I’m hungry, something to eat!
 So his mother momentarily forgot where
 she was
 —or she was forgotten
 by Him,
 God Who snatches time right from under
 our feet—
 and she quickly opened her satchel
 and gave her child this herring to eat.
 As if it were some silver bounty
 the young teeth
 grabbed the herring with pleasure.
 But quietly as though a nightingale 
 suddenly burst into song
 from far away across blue waters
 a fi ery string of notes
 of a sudden
 gave his head such a jolt.
 And out of the broken circle
 the naked child
 slid punctured into a pit.
 Frozen and grotesque
 this picture holds like a frieze:
 a child with a bloody herring in his mouth
 on a certain summer’s morning.
 And I search for that herring’s salt
 and still can not
 fi nd its taste on my lips. (581)
Here Sutzkever captures key elements of a child’s 
experience of genocide, an experience marked by 
general incomprehension of his or her circumstances, 
vulnerability and mortal dependence on the kindness 
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of adults, nostalgia for earlier and more comfortable 
times, and the sudden exposure to unimaginably brutal 
violence. 
Also present in the poem, partly because of the 
incomprehensibility of this violence, is the confusion 
of the surviving witness, Sutzkever’s speaker, who is 
confronted with the responsibility for making sense of 
this tragedy. The child’s fi nal moments confound the 
speaker; try as he might, he cannot crack them open 
to peer inside. They offer no insight into the deeper 
meaning of the child’s death, and synecdochically 
of the genocide, beyond their obvious evocation 
of disconnection, absence, and loss—all important 
components of mourning. The poem ends with its 
speaker attempting to locate the contours of the boy’s 
death experience but failing to do so. The boy’s fi nal 
moments of suffering remain visible from a distance 
only, their substance veiled by the passage of time 
and by the inevitable psychological and moral gulf 
separating the victim from the survivor. Such agony 
resists not merely signifi cation but conceptualization 
in the poem. It is what Theodor Adorno in his Negative 
Dialectics calls “the extremity that eludes the concept” 
(365),1 and, by virtue of this elusiveness, it provides 
only weak (at best diffuse) support for any narrower 
moral judgments, life lessons, or themes the poet might 
wish to advance. In this sense, Sutzkever may be seen 
to describe an event that actively contests its own 
interpretation. The moral work to be done in the wake of 
the Holocaust, he suggests, lies not in the thematization 
or judgment of the genocide (since the magnitude 
and arbitrariness of its violence quite literally beggars 
reason), but rather in the perpetual and always-already 
thwarted struggle to imagine—and thereby in some 
sense to recover and connect with—the phenomenal 
experience of atrocity itself.
Diffi culties associated with representing the 
Holocaust and with the effects of its representation have 
been much commented upon. From Adorno’s famous 
dictum concerning poetry’s barbarity in response to Paul 
Celan’s landmark Holocaust poem “Todesfuge” (1948), 
to Imre Kertész’s claim that the Holocaust may only be 
known through the mediating (and distorting) agency 
of art, to Hans Kellner’s assertion that the truth of the 
Holocaust must remain an article of faith, philosophers, 
historians, and creative artists have despaired of either 
generating or being given access to a stable conceptual 
platform from which to make sense of what is arguably 
the most traumatically signifi cant event in the recent 
history of the modern West. 
Alongside the many metaphysical and 
epistemological worries over the truth value of 
Holocaust representations lies a troubling moral 
concern perhaps best articulated by Adorno in an essay 
on political commitment in art. In “Commitment,” 
Adorno writes that he does not wish to retreat from 
his earlier claim that it is barbaric to continue writing 
poetry after Auschwitz, since the “so-called artistic 
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representation of the naked physical pain of those who were beaten 
down with rifl e butts contains, however distantly, the possibility that 
pleasure can be squeezed from it” (312). For Adorno, beauty and the 
aesthetic pleasure accompanying it undermine artists’ attempts to bear 
witness to atrocity in their works. Since all art claims at some level the 
power to please aesthetically, no art suffi ces to represent the cataclysmic 
atrocities of the Holocaust, a congeries of events whose grimness 
and accompanying moral seriousness preclude, on its face, pleasure 
of any sort. Aestheticizing the genocide at all, Adorno argues, makes 
“an unthinkable fate appear to have had some meaning; it becomes 
transfi gured, something of its horror is removed” (313). Art—particularly 
what Adorno calls politically “committed” art, such as that attempting to 
derive a specifi c moral message from the Holocaust—disfi gures reality. 
It does this in the case of genocide by serving to make unimaginable 
atrocities and suffering imaginable. The many languages of art bear 
witness to “how far the underlying poetic message and its subject have 
come apart” (311), their metonymic relation ruptured by the magnitude 
and variety of genocide’s horrors. Adorno notes the embarrassment 
that typically accompanies encounters with the art of atrocity. This art 
remains morally troubling and a source of unease not merely because 
it positions the spectator/reader sado-masochistically as a voyeur,2 but 
also because it produces a degrading complicity between the spectator/
reader and the perpetrator in the name of “working through the past.” 
This is a darkly ironic fi nal role to assign to the victims of Nazi violence. 
Adorno argues that those destroyed by the Nazis “are used to create 
something, works of art, that are thrown to the consumption of a world 
which destroyed them” (312). Profoundly aware of mass culture’s 
dangerously seductive anaesthetic power, he concludes that, “when 
even genocide becomes part of the cultural heritage in the themes of 
For Adorno, beauty 
and the aesthetic 
pleasure accompanying 
it undermine artists’ 
attempts to bear 
witness to atrocity in 
their works.
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[art], it becomes easier to continue to play along with 
the culture which gave birth to murder” (313). 
Adorno nevertheless continues to value artworks for 
providing one of the sole remaining venues available for 
the (necessarily imperfect) representation of suffering. 
On his view, suffering can only be ignored by art at 
tremendous moral and psychosocial cost. Indeed, doing 
so imperils history itself. He writes that “The abundance 
of real suffering tolerates no forgetting. . . . 
Yet this suffering—what Hegel called consciousness of 
adversity—also demands the continued existence of 
art while it prohibits it” (312). This is because “hardly 
anywhere else does suffering fi nd its own voice, a 
consolation that does not immediately betray it” (313). 
Art must suffi ce for the representation of atrocity, 
since nothing else even comes close to doing so. Art 
continues to exist after Auschwitz and, by the mere fact 
of that persistence, serves to rebuff the genocidaire’s 
totalitarian demands for singularity and homogeneity, as 
well as for absolute political and moral conformity. He 
observes that “literature must . . . be such that its mere 
existence after Auschwitz is not a surrender to cynicism” 
(312).
Authors confronted with the massive task of 
representing the Holocaust, then, must strive hard 
to avoid a number of signifi cant pitfalls that Adorno 
feels risk betraying suffering: they must acknowledge 
the limits of their representation in its power to evoke 
the past; they must grant the fact that the Holocaust 
per se is unrepresentable as a totality and proceed 
in the knowledge that artists have available to them 
tools limited to the evocation of only fragments of 
the genocide; and they must understand their task as 
primarily that of the aestheticization of human suffering, 
all the while remaining attentive to the risks inherent 
in doing the artist’s job too well. For aesthetic pleasure 
weakens (by complicating) the force of representations 
of atrocity; it risks attributing a pragmatic value to 
genocide and, concomitantly, it forces an elision of 
the reader/viewer’s and the perpetrator’s perspective 
both at the level of affect and (not entirely causally 
independently) at the level of moral judgment. Lastly, 
they must remain attentive to their responsibilities as 
transmitters of history, conduits (however imperfect) 
through which the events of the past come to be known 
and understood. The one who represents atrocity, real 
atrocity even if largely fi ctionalized—what Lillian 
Boraks-Nemetz refers to in The Old Brown Suitcase as 
a work of “documentary fi ction” (196)—speaks for the 
dead and the damaged. The shaping of their world—and 
the narrative texture (at least in literature) given to their 
voices and thoughts—is therefore freighted with moral 
signifi cance. This is perhaps the gravest responsibility 
assumed by those representing the Holocaust (and it is 
both an aesthetic and a moral burden): that of letting its 
victims speak as much as possible for themselves. 
Sutzkever’s poem succeeds as a Holocaust 
representation in precisely these terms. The poet readily 
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acknowledges the descriptive and evaluative limits 
of his representation. Indeed, the precise terms of the 
synecdoche linking Sutzkever’s victims to millions of 
others remain unavailable from the poem. The poet’s 
studied representation of his speaker’s inability to 
penetrate the consciousness of either mother or child 
gestures toward the representational limits inherent 
in constructive artistic engagements with genocide. 
No representational language or medium, he fi nally 
acknowledges, will serve to reveal the intensity or 
deeper signifi cance of their suffering. In this way, by 
refusing to speculate on their contents, Sutzkever avoids 
doing an injustice to the mother’s and child’s death 
experiences; he cannot provide them with a determinate 
(it would be wholly presumed) form and substance. By 
foreclosing on the readerly satisfactions arising from 
clear answers to such questions as “Why did this take 
place?,” “What were they thinking?,” “What might this 
have felt like?,” and “What does this event mean?”), 
Sutzkever keeps these questions alive. Rather than 
speaking for the dead or pronouncing sagely on their 
fate, he instead proffers silence, confusion, horror, and 
regret.
How, then, must writers proceed when they intend 
to represent such events to children? The three works 
under review in this essay converge as well as diverge 
in their responses to this question. To different degrees, 
each of their authors follows Sutzkever in providing an 
inevitably partial glimpse at the wider horrors under 
description in them, though, unlike the poet, each 
uniformly and systematically strives to create bases for 
identifi cation between readers and subjects. The stock in 
trade of books like these (and there are many) consists in 
undertaking the work of moral and political education 
through affi liation by arousing readers’ emotions and 
sympathies via their recognition of the dangers besetting 
people “just like them.” By encouraging readers to see 
themselves in their protagonists, each of these texts aims 
in different ways to bridge the historical and cultural 
distance separating readers from the Holocaust. Such 
bridging arguably furthers the cause of social justice by 
rendering the injustice experienced, particularly by the 
Nazis’ child victims, relevant to contemporary readers. 
All three works centre on the lives of young people 
and their families; in each, the central characters face 
great diffi culties and risk imprisonment and death at the 
hands of the Nazis. Lillian Boraks-Nemetz’s The Old 
Brown Suitcase, fi rst published in 1994, details a young 
Polish girl’s experiences of the Warsaw Ghetto and 
subsequent relocation to Canada. The novel has been 
critically praised, translated into French and Polish, 
adapted for the stage, and is currently available in a 
new edition with a foreword by Robert Krell, Professor 
of Psychiatry at the University of British Columbia and 
president of the Vancouver Holocaust Centre Society 
for Education and Remembrance. It maps thirteen-year-
old Slava Lenski’s journey from a cultured existence 
as a member of a prosperous non-practising Jewish 
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family in Warsaw, through the indignities of life in (and 
a precarious escape from) the Warsaw Ghetto, time 
subsequently spent hiding in the Polish countryside, and 
fi nally the family’s reunion and emigration to Montreal, 
via Halifax, in July 1947. Although Boraks-Nemetz’s 
main focus remains the destruction of community 
and alienation from place that accompanied the 
Nazis’ European pogrom, she continues to be nearly 
as much concerned in her novel with Slava’s travails 
as she attempts to settle into post-Second World War 
Canada (Montreal, Ste-Adèle, and Rockville). The 
detailed descriptions provided of this new life, one 
free from most, but not all, of the prejudice and risk 
that marked her recent time in Poland, do much to 
shed light on Canadian domestic, political, and social 
relations of the period, as well as the struggles of 
immigrants in this country more generally. Throughout 
the novel, beginning with the Lenski family’s arrival in 
Montreal, chapters detailing events in Poland (Warsaw 
and Zalesie) are interleaved with ones describing 
Slava’s Canadian experiences. This formal disruption 
of linear time and space works to strengthen the 
reader’s awareness of the signifi cance of earlier events 
to immigrants’ understanding of themselves in their 
new homelands. Additionally, and more pointedly, 
the juxtaposition serves to underscore the alterity and 
intense diffi culty of Slava’s earlier life. 
This contrast manifests itself at several junctures in 
the novel, but especially early on when Slava is rudely 
asked by Ina, the daughter of the Lenskis’ Canadian 
sponsors, to explain why she is eating an orange 
so greedily. Rather than responding overtly to Ina’s 
insensitivity, a confrontation that years spent hiding from 
the Nazis have trained her to avoid, Slava instead thinks 
to herself: “Because I haven’t eaten oranges for six 
years. . . . Because there were no oranges in Poland 
during the war and none afterwards when peace 
fi nally came. Because I was often close to starvation” 
(8). The reasons for Slava’s behaviour are available 
to the audience but not the other characters, and so 
readers are encouraged to understand her deprivations 
and losses not abstractly but concretely. The scene 
is delicate and subtle: Slava’s deference to Ina might 
seem counterintuitive to contemporary imaginations 
weaned on a popular-culture diet of revenge and 
self-assertion, but the very strangeness of this behaviour 
serves as a placeholder for Slava’s earlier trauma, the 
details of which are (as they appear in Slava’s thoughts) 
strategically inaccessible. Slava’s internal monologue 
gestures toward the phenomenology, the lived 
experience, of her suffering. Her pain is evoked through 
her imagined response to Ina just as it emerges from her 
silent acceptance of Ina’s incredulity; in neither case 
can it be precisely delimited and easily understood. In 
this way, Boraks-Nemetz achieves a kind of referential 
integrity that links her fi ction to the historical genocide.
Such semantically rich opacities and occlusions 
recur frequently throughout The Old Brown Suitcase. 
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Perhaps the most disturbing of these concerns the death of Slava’s younger 
sister Basia late in the war. Basia is sent into hiding with Tomas and 
Anna, a childless gentile couple living in the town of Otwock. When 
Slava and her parents reunite in 1944, Basia’s absence is palpable and 
Slava’s father explains that Tomas informed him that one of his neighbours 
identifi ed Basia as a Jew and reported her to the German authorities. 
Tomas and Anna were ordered to take Basia to the town’s administrative 
headquarters, following which, Tomas claims, she was murdered by 
soldiers. As proof, he takes Slava’s father to view the partially buried 
body of a young girl wearing Basia’s socks, a girl whose face has been 
disfi gured beyond recognition. The family, especially Slava’s grandmother, 
is suspicious of Tomas’s version of events. In response, Slava’s father says: 
“Maybe you are right, Mama, even so, how can I prove it now? Tomas 
swears that she is dead.” Refl ecting on her father’s words, and sensing 
the legitimacy of his doubt, Slava ponders to herself: “I want to think that 
Babushka is right, that Basia is alive somewhere. Will I ever know?” (136).
This is not a question to which the text returns, and the mystery 
surrounding Basia’s fate remains intact. The open-endedness of 
Slava’s question resists easy or comprehensive (and thus reductively 
distorting) explanations. The question relies on a form of apophasis, the 
rhetorical trope which invokes a thing’s presence by acknowledging its 
absence. As Kate McLoughlin notes in an essay on the language of war 
representations, apophasis is frequently deployed in representations 
of atrocities whose scale and intensity are otherwise unimaginable. It 
temporarily and partially returns to perception the dead, the missing, and 
those whom Toni Morrison labels the “disremembered” (275). As with 
Sutzkever’s speaker, who is confronted with the image of the mother and 
the child motionless before him, the text nevertheless remains unable to 
pass judgment on their fate.
. . . apophasis . . . . 
temporarily and partially 
returns to perception 
the dead, the missing, 
and those whom Toni 
Morrison labels the 
“disremembered.”
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The exploitation of silences and absences is not 
the only means available to those who represent 
atrocity and who wish to do justice to human 
suffering by allowing it to remain inchoate in their 
work. Simplifi cation is an additional tool artists may 
use simultaneously to acknowledge and selectively 
to under-represent genocide and its effects. It is 
fi rst necessary, however, to distinguish between 
“simplifi cation,” which aims to pare a representation 
down to those of its features that contribute directly to 
capturing what Immanuel Kant calls the “noumenon” 
(250), or thing-in-itself, and what I wish to designate as 
“reduction,” which degrades a representation’s meaning 
and signifi cance by reconfi guring its embodiment of 
the noumenon. Put another way, simplifi cation aims 
at directness and largely concerns matters of form; 
reduction involves matters of content. Simplifi cations 
are not necessarily reductive, though they are 
sometimes conducive to reductivism. Instead, they are 
intended to generate clearer insights into whatever 
happens to be under their description. Alternatively, 
reductions pare; they are largely indifferent to 
complexities, most problematically when the noumenon 
is genuinely complicated. This indifference is precisely 
what makes reductions so prone to do moral harm since 
they underwrite what Charles Taylor, drawing on Hegel, 
describes as failures of recognition (25–73). While the 
moral stakes inherent in simplifi cation and reduction 
(especially in representations of atrocity) are essentially 
the same, reduction exposes artists more frequently to 
the risk of doing harm.
Goodbye Marianne, the graphic novel written by 
Irene Watts and illustrated by Kathryn Shoemaker, is a 
simplifi ed work of Holocaust representation. Indeed, the 
Holocaust per se is nearly absent from the novel, which 
depicts the days prior to protagonist Marianne Kohn’s 
departure from Berlin for England as one of the ten 
thousand children rescued from near-certain destruction 
by the Kindertransport, the charitable initiative aimed at 
saving Jewish children from further persecution that was 
launched shortly following Kristallnacht.3 Its focus is not 
on murder but rather on what Art Spiegelman in Maus 
calls the inexorable process of “the noose tightening” 
(71), the felt intensifi cation of the Nazis’ attempts to 
restrict the lives of Jews prior to their deportation and 
extermination. These attempts began in earnest with 
the passing in 1935 of the Nuremburg Laws, which 
radically restricted German Jews’ civil rights, including 
the right to German citizenship and the right to marry 
non-Jews. The Nazis’ efforts at persecution intensifi ed in 
1937 with additional attempts to deprive Jews of their 
livelihoods; by 1938, for example, Jewish doctors were 
prohibited from treating non-Jews and Jewish lawyers 
were stripped of their right to practise law. Also in 1938, 
all Jewish men were required to add the name “Israel” 
to their identifi cation papers and all Jewish women to 
add “Sara,” a sinister act of bureaucratic redesignation, 
the pain of which Watts and Shoemaker capture with 
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admirable subtlety. Following Kristallnacht, the Nazis 
isolated Jews from their fellow Germans further: Jews 
were banned from public cinemas, theatres, sports 
facilities, public gatherings, and schools. It is precisely 
at this moment, on 15 November 1938, that Goodbye 
Marianne opens. 
We fi rst meet eleven-year-old Marianne leaving 
home for school, only to be rebuffed at the institution’s 
front door. Her expulsion is foreshadowed by her 
recollection of earlier racist abuse she has suffered at 
the hands of Mr. Vogel, a Nazi zealot and senior teacher 
at her school, and it is suggested more indirectly by 
the novel’s opening frame, the fi rst of a sequence of 
single-paned title pages introducing every chapter. 
Under the heading “Expelled,” we are shown a fuzzily 
drawn girl walking past a door to a building we later 
learn is her school. Her indistinct facial features—they 
are essentially absent—deny her a fi xed identity. 
After all, the story has not yet begun, its characters 
are still strangers to readers, and the setting once the 
narrative gets underway is Marianne’s apartment. The 
girl is intended to be unidentifi able. She serves as a 
generalization and is best understood not as a person 
but as a “Jew,” her faith suggested by her anxious stoop 
below the fascist banners and by her apparent haste to 
pass the building. In the absence of more information (a 
sign, some kind of utterance, other people), this building 
likewise lacks a fi xed identity. It is given to readers as 
simply an institution or a business of some kind whose 
relationship to the Nazi state is signalled by the brace 
of Party banners hanging above its windows, fl apping in 
the breeze and blocking their light. These banners evoke 
the inevitable ignorance that accompanies genocidal 
hatred the world over. More signifi cantly, as they fl ap, 
the banners obscure large sections of the building 
underneath, provocatively suggesting the extent to 
which the Nazi project had secured political dominance 
in Germany by 1938 and created a broadly sanctioned 
social ethic, what Hans Georg Gadamer calls a 
“lifeworld” (182), predicated on the hatred of Jews. This 
lifeworld, as Daniel Goldhagen rather hyperbolically 
claims, effectively arose as a consequence of the 
transformation of ordinary Germans into Hitler’s 
“willing executioners.” It is with Marianne’s confusion 
and terror at the ubiquity and terrible power of these 
“executioners” that Goodbye Marianne is primarily 
concerned. 
Throughout the novel, we fi nd plenty of instances of 
ordinary Germans more and less horrifi cally lashing out 
at Jews. Resting in a park following her expulsion from 
school, Marianne befriends an Aryan girl of roughly 
the same age with whom she plays. Upon identifying 
Marianne as Jewish, her playmate screams at her in 
hatred, informing her that she has no right to sit on park 
benches reserved for Germans. Walking home from 
the park, Marianne acknowledges a policeman who 
says “Heil Hitler” to her. She witnesses the after-effects 
of Kristallnacht and is especially troubled by evidence 
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of Jewish businesses destroyed or taken over by non-
Jewish Germans. She observes fi rst-hand the abduction 
of Jewish civilians by the SS and hears from her father, 
who has escaped recent detention and subsequent 
deportation by the authorities, about the horrors of the 
concentration camp at Sachsenhausen, used by the 
Nazis at this time primarily to house political prisoners. 
Marianne’s more immediate concern, however, is 
the family’s summary eviction from their apartment. 
Watts and Shoemaker are especially adept at depicting 
Marianne’s surprise at these experiences, an emotion 
that is intensifi ed by its contrast to the kindness and 
consideration that Germans otherwise show her when 
they are unaware of her heritage.
The most important of Marianne’s encounters 
with ordinary Germans involves her friendship with 
Ernest Block, a young boy from the countryside who 
accompanies his mother on a brief visit to her old friend 
and Marianne’s landlady, Mrs. Schwartz. Marianne’s 
relationship with Ernest gives her the opportunity to 
witness a version of Nazifi cation fi rst-hand. Although 
their friendship begins amicably enough—both children 
share a passion for Erich Kästner’s children’s novel 
Emil and the Detectives and enjoy exploring Berlin’s 
outdoor markets together—it falls apart when Ernest 
discovers that Marianne is Jewish. He has never met 
a Jew before, but he has learned about them from his 
beloved brother (a member of the Hitler Youth) and his 
father (a formerly unemployed Nazi booster). In the 
wake of this revelation, Marianne challenges Ernest to 
choose between upholding his family’s values or his 
friendship with her. He chooses the former. He verbally 
dismisses Marianne as “ignorant” and “a troublemaker” 
and gives her the Nazi salute before storming off to 
Mrs. Schwartz’s apartment. Marianne’s response to his 
cruel rejection is naked hatred, not just for Ernest but 
for all Germans. This hatred is a double-edged sword. 
While cutting through the pain of Ernest’s betrayal it 
simultaneously lacerates Marianne to the bone, for 
she has up to this point in her life thought of herself 
as German too. Her devastation is complete: loathing 
and self-loathing combine violently to leave her feeling 
alienated from her former life, leaving her feeling 
thoroughly disoriented and scared.
The chapter containing Marianne’s falling-out 
with Ernest ends wordlessly with a frame depicting 
only the girl’s tear-fi lled, anguished eyes. It is in this 
subtle sense that I wish to claim Goodbye Marianne 
as a Holocaust novel. The word “Holocaust,” after all, 
derives from Greek roots of the words for “burnt” and 
“whole,” terms together signifying complete destruction. 
This is something perfectly captured by the Hebrew 
word for the Nazi genocide, “Shoah,” meaning “utter 
devastation” or “catastrophe.” Catastrophe, as the 
ancient Greeks knew it, betokened an overturning in 
which nothing is left unchanged, and what the novel 
succeeds admirably in depicting is how Marianne’s 
lifeworld and, by extension, the daily lives of all 
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European Jewry, was catastrophized under the Nazis. 
Such devastation is aesthetically sublime, in the Kantian sense 
of being boundless and therefore unrepresentable, since it is 
quite literally beyond the power of the senses to grasp. And yet it 
is testament to the aptness and force of Watts’s and Shoemaker’s 
collaboration that this catastrophe is evoked so perfectly in their novel. 
The simplicity of Shoemaker’s drawings allows her images to convey 
the essence of Marianne’s suffering effi ciently while at the same time 
suggesting her imperfect understanding of the world around her. 
By minimizing the depiction of violence and concentrating instead 
on more familiar (and therefore cognitively and sympathetically 
accessible) alterations to social relations, Watts and Shoemaker also 
ensure that their young readers are not distracted by the awfulness and 
scale of the wider set of events adjacent to those being narrated. While 
the collapse of Marianne’s lifeworld remains sublimely profound, 
it comes to be understood by readers via the metonymic agency of 
small moments and (for the most part) petty cruelties. Like Boraks-
Nemetz’s novel, Goodbye Marianne underdetermines rather than 
overdetermines its interpretation. Occurrences such as Ernest’s parting 
note to Marianne, in which he does not apologize but nevertheless 
cryptically asks her to remember that all Germans are not the same, 
are encountered but never analyzed or discussed further. Readers 
remain at a loss as to what exactly to make of the statement. We 
only have Ernest’s word that not all Germans are anti-Semitic, yet his 
earlier actions belie his words. Their meaning and their truth value are 
therefore indeterminate.
The most important question hanging over this novel, though, 
is a large one that has remained unanswered over the course of its 
being grappled with by historians, philosophers, and creative artists 
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both in Germany and abroad: how could something 
like the Holocaust have happened without at least the 
passive acceptance of a genocidal ideology by nearly all 
Germans (and their sympathizers) alive during the Nazi 
era? Watts and Shoemaker seem to endorse Goldhagen’s 
view that
Germans’ antisemitic beliefs about Jews were the 
central causal agent of the Holocaust. . . . 
[A]ntisemitism moved many thousands of “ordinary” 
Germans—and would have moved millions more, 
had they been appropriately positioned—to 
slaughter Jews. Not economic hardship, not the 
coercive means of a totalitarian state, not the 
social psychological pressure, not invariable 
psychological propensities, but ideas about Jews 
that were pervasive in Germany, and had been for 
decades, induced ordinary Germans to kill unarmed, 
defenseless Jewish men, women, and children by the 
thousands, systematically and without pity.  (9)
Against the strength of this claim, Ernest’s parting 
gesture seems frail and unpersuasive, but in its 
apparent sincerity it does make the matter of accepting 
Goldhagen’s argument more diffi cult. This serves to keep 
the question of ordinary Germans’ complicity in the 
Holocaust alive.
Of the three texts under consideration here, Kathy 
Kacer and Sharon E. McKay’s Whispers from the Ghettos 
is the most surprising and important when evaluated as 
a work of Holocaust children’s literature. The text draws 
together twelve brief and otherwise unrelated accounts 
of children’s experiences of ghettoization, the Nazis’ 
strategy of gathering together Jews and other “social 
undesirables” in various densely packed urban centres 
prior to their deportation to concentration camps 
and, with the exception of handfuls of survivors, their 
summary execution. All of the volume’s accounts are 
based on fact, though some literary license has been 
taken in their presentation. Nevertheless, ghettoization 
is correctly shown to involve the loss of property, 
starvation, disease, deportation, increasing fear and 
desperation, and both lingering and sudden death. These 
experiences proved traumatic, especially for children 
from wealthier families whose parents struggled (mostly 
unsuccessfully) to cope with their radically altered 
circumstances. Their earlier privileges profoundly 
ill-equipped them for the darkly Hobbesian character of 
ghetto life. 
Ghettoization was a diverse phenomenon. As Kacer 
and McKay make clear in the brief but instructive 
introduction to their collection, the Nazis created 356 
ghettos across occupied Eastern Europe between 1939 
and 1945, in communities varying in size from small 
villages to large cities such as Warsaw. Ghettos housed 
populations ranging from a few dozen to hundreds 
of thousands of Jews. Some were bounded by walls, 
especially in larger urban centres, but in smaller towns 
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ghettos were often left open and Jews simply ordered not to leave 
specifi c neighbourhoods. No matter the ghetto, however, Jews were 
required at all times to wear the yellow Star of David on their clothing, 
and they were obliged to adhere (on penalty of death) to a series of 
dehumanizing, often petty regulations as the price of their continued 
existence. Ghetto inhabitants generally found the experience of 
conforming to these dictates diffi cult, often impossible, and in any case 
fi nally pointless since adherence could at best guarantee a temporary 
stay of execution, as well as the prolongation of fear and suffering. 
Absurd hopelessness of this kind proves notoriously diffi cult to 
aestheticize, at least partly because its irrational core undermines 
reason’s ability to make orderly sense of what is laid out (via the 
senses) before it. The unimaginability of ghetto life is repeatedly 
asserted throughout the collection, most consistently in Kacer and 
McKay’s introduction where they write that “It’s probably impossible 
to imagine that this could have happened to young people. . . . It’s 
probably impossible to imagine that any one of us would have to give 
up our homes, our belongings, and be separated from our friends 
and neighbours. . . . Who could have imagined it?” (xiv–xv). In 
partial answer to these questions, Kacer and McKay recommend that 
their young readers “Hear [the whispers of those ghettoized]; listen; 
imagine” (xv). Their emphasis on the imagination here suggests that 
the contents of this collection are not intended to evoke a singular 
response to the Holocaust as a whole, but rather to stimulate readers’ 
imaginations and strengthen their identifi cation with the young 
victims of Nazi violence. The precise terms of that identifi cation 
are deliberately under-specifi ed in Whispers from the Ghettos. The 
collection’s title alerts readers to the subdued and distorted character 
of its contents (the stories are still just whispers after all), and the 
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fragmentary character of the collection as a whole 
resists any decisive interpretative synthesis. Each of the 
collection’s stories depicts a unique but emotionally 
resonant slice of time in the life of a young person who 
is confronted with the enormous challenges of survival 
in desperately awful conditions. Each contains a sharply 
delineated mini-tragedy whose connection to the larger 
genocide is explained in a brief postscript detailing 
the subsequent fates of the story’s protagonist and his 
or her family. Crucially, however, each postscript falls 
deliberately short of offering a meta-level (moral or 
other) judgment of this outcome.
Especially striking in this regard is the experience 
of Elly Gotz, who was imprisoned in the Kovno Ghetto 
in what is now Kaunas, Lithuania, from 1941 to 1944. 
The Gotz family was trapped in Kovno for nearly the 
duration of the ghetto’s existence in conditions that 
were very different from those they enjoyed prior to the 
war. Elly’s story begins by recalling the normalcy of this 
earlier life only to slide quickly into an acknowledgment 
of the hardships of its ghetto successor. His mother 
has just watched a child die for want of medicine in 
the clinic in which she works, and his father is slowly 
starving as a slave labourer working to construct the 
Nazis’ nearby airport complex. Elly himself despairs of 
ever understanding their oppressors’ intense desire for 
confi scated Jewish property, most devastatingly (for him) 
his bicycle. For his father, it is not the disappearance of 
furniture and jewelry that most disturbs him but, rather, 
the Nazis’ destruction of books. “The mind must be fed 
too,” he explains to his wife in defence of his refusal 
to relinquish his family’s small pre-war library. It soon 
becomes clear that, for him, it is not what books contain 
but what they can do that matters, most importantly 
their power to preserve and transmit a culture. For him, 
the survival of books is crucially indexed to the survival 
of European liberal humanism and the accompanying 
secularism and tolerance that allowed Jews to fl ourish 
throughout much of Europe for the century or more 
preceding the Shoah. It is with this tradition that Elly’s 
father, an assimilated Jew, most closely identifi es.
In response to a new directive from the Germans 
to destroy all remaining books in the ghetto, Elly and 
his father lovingly pack the family’s books into boxes 
that they load onto a wheelbarrow. Together, the two 
move their collection through the ghetto’s streets, 
which are sparingly but vividly brought to life by the 
collection’s authors. Arriving at the specifi ed collection 
point, the community’s synagogue, father and son are 
stunned to fi nd the building overfl owing with books, 
including masterworks of the Western canon. Elly is 
uncomprehending. His father, though, begins to laugh 
in delight at the vast cultural wealth on display before 
him. He says: “My son, they do not trust us with trinkets, 
but with books, more valuable than anything, they 
trust” (17). The sight of the treasures before them causes 
Elly’s father to change his mind. With a contagious joy, 
he starts loading books by Shakespeare, Goethe, and 
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Tolstoy back on to his wheelbarrow, and together he and 
Elly make seven trips back and forth to the synagogue 
to pick up books and then stash them in the family 
residence. When the work is fi nally done, Elly claps his 
hands together in delight and thinks to himself, “It was 
a victory over the Nazis, our victory” (13). Here, in the 
midst of the horrors of internment, we unexpectedly 
locate pleasure and delight. More importantly, we fi nd 
triumph in the midst of a most abject and thoroughgoing 
defeat. As Elly is keenly aware, the mere presence of 
these emotions in an environment marked by starvation 
and death constitutes a substantial victory over Nazi 
oppression. 
We learn from the postscript to Elly’s story that his 
father’s library did not survive the ghetto’s destruction 
in 1944, rendering the lasting signifi cance of the 
achievement inconclusive. However, we also learn 
that Elly’s entire family did survive the Holocaust. Elly 
explains that his father’s library serves as the source of 
his education for the duration of his time in the ghetto 
and that the books have become a part of him. His 
survival therefore ensures the survival of the values and 
liberal principles that the books represent and serve 
to reinforce. Readers are encouraged to take seriously 
Elly’s father’s prescient observation offered earlier in the 
narrative that “We shall outlive [the Nazis]” (12–13). 
At the same time, the many other stories in Whispers 
from the Ghettos testify to the vast losses (of all kinds) 
incurred by Jews during the Holocaust, and so any 
sense of real triumph, any idea that there might be some 
lasting good to come out of the genocide, is explicitly 
undercut. Here again we fi nd Holocaust representers 
in their work giving with their left hands what they 
take away with their right ones, and the effects of 
this retraction, as with the techniques adopted by the 
authors of the other two books considered in this essay, 
are moral disorientation and semantic indeterminacy. 
Each of the three texts considered in this essay 
is excellent in its own right. All are well crafted, 
inventive, and engaging, and all three refl ect the state 
of current academic thinking about the Holocaust, 
particularly such scholarly trends as the turn away 
from the concentration camp as the paradigmatic 
location of the genocide. Over the last few years, 
the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum has 
staged exhibits dealing with topics as varied as Jewish 
resistance, ghettoization, the Nazis’ T4 program,4 and 
the remarkable Ringleblum Archive, the collection of 
documents5 assembled by intellectuals and members of 
the wider community preserving the collective memory 
of day-to-day life in the Warsaw Ghetto. Scholars now, 
for the most part, accept that there was not just one 
Holocaust, but many. By approaching the genocide in 
a way that acknowledges both its multi-facetedness and 
stubborn refusal to be known (and represented) in its 
entirety, the writers and the illustrator of the three texts 
I have discussed here all strongly merit further attention 
and critical respect.
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Notes
 1 My thanks to Kate McLoughlin for this reference.
 2 For more on this concern, see Baer. 
 3 The term “Kristallnacht” refers to the “Night of Broken Glass,” 
during which Jewish businesses were attacked by Nazis and their 
supporters, leaving glass strewn on city streets across Germany and 
Austria. The event took place on 9–10 November 1938.
 4 This program targeted the disabled for extermination. Lessons 
learned from T4 informed the design of the concentration camps.
 5 These include decrees, diaries, reports, works of literature and 
documentary reportage, coupons, and candy wrappers.
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